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The concept of national cinemas is not coextensive with cinema itself. In some ways, 
national cinemas can be said to have existed only since the late silent or early sound 
era. For the first two or three decades after the birth of cinema, films were not 
explicitly identified with a particular nation-state; and production companies were 
international, sending camera operators, films for exhibition and, before long, 
production subsidiaries around the world. Before the advent of intertitles around 
1903, films even ‘spoke’ local languages, as exhibitors narrated the action for viewers 
while they watched the images flicker across the screen.  But then, in the latter years 
of that decade, films made in US subsidiaries of French production companies and 
otherwise indistinguishable from American fare came to be branded as ‘foreign’ by 
US companies keen to stake out a domestic market for their own films (Abel, 1999) 
and, after World War I, when domination of world markets shifted definitively from 
France to the United States, cinema in other parts of the world was ‘nationalised’ 
economically through the introduction of state subsidies and protectionist measures, 
in large part as a reaction to the emergent hegemony of Hollywood.  Finally, through 
linguistic means, the coming of sound in the late 1920s and early 1930s, before the 
perfection of dubbing technology, cemented the process of national identification.  
Yet national cinema has never been an unproblematic category. The 20th 
century, with two World Wars, the demise of dynastic and colonial empires, and the 
end of the Cold War, was a volatile period for the emergence and dissolution of 
nation-states (and thus of national cinemas). The fall of the Berlin Wall, for example, 
brought an end to East German cinema per se, which is now a historical and archival 
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phenomenon, although former East German filmmakers certainly retain a distinctive 
voice. And what are the institutional dynamics of a stateless cinema such as that of 
Palestine? National cinemas are continually in process, evolving with the ebb and 
flow of nation-states, and with the importance of the nation-state itself as both a 
geopolitical force and a conceptual entity. 
Shifting political landscapes at the sub-national level too can affect a national 
cinema’s status. Apartheid-era South African films have a problematic place within film 
history, and have been routinely excluded from accounts of African cinema. Since the 
end of apartheid, South African films have circulated more widely and have attracted 
much more international interest (although even then, not always without controversy: 
when Tsotsi won the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film in 2006, many in 
its home country considered the film, which was directed by the white South African 
Gavin Hood, to be so ‘Hollywoodised’ as to be almost unrecognisably South African). 
Then too, political forces can make national cinemas inaccessible altogether. For 
example, although the first Korean feature film was made in 1923, there are no extant 
pre-1945 feature films, because these were either destroyed during the Korean War or 
suppressed during Japanese imperial rule in the early part of the century.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, cinema was embraced by many nation-states as a 
potential tool in the struggle to reassert national autonomy in the wake of decolonisation. 
The Third Cinema movement, which began in Latin America and was soon invoked by 
film-makers in Asia and Africa, at once supported these national struggles and asserted 
an international solidarity among Third World countries (see also Third world and post-
colonial cinema, p. 00). In particular, Lusophone African states such as Mozambique and 
Angola adopted a form of ‘guerilla’ film-making that attempted to merge Marxist 
theories with film practice, resulting in a politically committed cinema. Many African 
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film-makers, including the Francophone directors Ousmane Sembène from Senegal and 
Souleymane Cissé from Mali, trained in the USSR, where they learned cinematic 
techniques from Soviet directors. Similarly, today, many South African film-makers and 
funding bodies view cinema as an important expression of post-apartheid democratic 
principles. 
However, in the absence of clear principles of political commitment or 
propaganda, national identity is an elusive category when applied to cinema. Even the 
most apparently straightforward criteria of the director’s nationality or audience 
preferences are not always helpful. For example, many of the most prominent arthouse 
films closely identified with a national cinema have been made by foreign nationals, 
usually by émigré directors and other personnel. The Spaniards Luis Buñuel and Salvador 
Dalí made what would become the bedrock of  ‘French’ surrealist films in the interwar 
period; both Charlie Chaplin and Alfred Hitchcock, two of the most celebrated auteurs of 
American cinema, came from Britain, and many other prominent film-makers working in 
the post-war era were Europeans who had emigrated to the United States. Many landmark 
African films of the 1950s and 1960s were made by Africans living abroad, because 
Africans were barred from making films in the colonial era. In recent times, the 
Mandarin-language international blockbuster Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) 
was made by Taiwan-born Ang Lee, who now lives in Connecticut. The concept of 
national cinema is even less straightforward in the transnational era, when multinational 
co-productions are becoming increasingly common. If we look to audiences to give the 
term ‘national cinema’ meaning, then we are in for incoherence: viewers in West Africa 
prefer kung-fu films and Bollywood musicals to homegrown fare, and European viewers 
watch more American films than films produced in their own countries. The fact that 
South Korean viewers began displaying a preference for domestic films over foreign 
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films in the late 1990s has been heralded as a remarkable sign of the unusual robustness 
of the Korean film industry, rather than as something to be taken for granted (see, for 
example, Roger Clarke, “The Life and Seoul of the Party,” The Independent, 27 April 
2001). All in all, one could be forgiven for wondering if national cinema was merely a 
short-lived phenomenon, a temporary blip on the world cinematic radar. In the era of 
globalisation, is it still possible to speak of national cinemas at all, or have they receded, 
like the withering away of the state that Friedrich Engels so famously predicted some 130 
years ago, if in a rather different context (Engels 1878)?  
Certainly, and to a large extent, national cinema is a relational, conceptual 
category, constructed in response to the domination of American cinema, which is 
often conceived as the only truly globalised, or ‘region-free’ cinema (like the DVD 
players that have become a significant means of exhibition). However, the 
Hollywood/World Cinema dichotomy is challenged by the fact that virtually all 
cinemas today are deeply hybridised. The widespread adoption of foreign film genres 
and narrative strategies complicates attempts to associate national cinemas with 
indigenous traditions or characteristics. For example, Nigerian films often incorporate 
Bollywood-inspired tales of good versus evil, but they also employ indigenous 
folkloric motifs and frames of reference. These same traditional elements could be 
said to bypass the national altogether, as the nation-state structure was imposed in 
Africa in the colonial era. Palestianian guerilla films of the 1960s and 1970s were 
inspired generically by American westerns, but they were clearly not inspired by 
American politics. This hybridisation, moreover, does not merely reflect a one-way 
stream of influence from Hollywood, as films such as Quentin Tarantino’s two-part 
Kill Bill (2003/4), with its overt references to Southeast Asian martial arts films, 
suggest (and the flourishing US independent film sector reminds us that ‘American 
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cinema’ is by no means homogeneous). Nor does hybridisation imply a two-way 
relation between Hollywood and ‘the rest’, but rather a multi-directional exchange, 
with different patterns and currents predominating at various times and in various 
places around the globe.  These exchanges are often uneven, but they are uneven in 
different ways at different times (see Transnational film studies, p. 00). 
Films often acquire national status through their settings and storylines, such 
as the ‘heritage’ films of Britain and France, or the Bangladeshi film The Clay 
Bird/Matir Moina/ (Tareque and Catherine Masud, 2002), which, despite being made 
with French money, is strongly identified with its setting in the Bangladeshi war of 
independence from Pakistan.  But setting is not synonymous with location shooting, 
especially when other locations are made to stand in for settings depicted on screen 
for financial reasons (lower production costs or tax breaks), or when sets or special 
effects are used to conjure up a place. At the same time, particular locales have often 
been represented on screen long before they come to be associated with the national 
identity of a body of films, as in the case of Scotland, which was represented in films 
such as the Ealing comedy Whisky Galore! (Alexander Mackendrick, 1949) well 
before the first indigenously-funded, full-length Scottish feature film was made, That 
Sinking Feeling (Bill Forsyth, 1979). Scenes of Africa had been familiar to viewers 
the world over since the beginning of the 20th century, but it was only in 1955 that 
what is considered to be the first sub-Saharan African film was made, the short 
feature Afrique sur Seine (Paulin Soumanou Vieyra), yet this film was shot, and set, in 
Paris (Sembène’s 1965 La Noire de …, considered to be the first feature-length film 
made in sub-Saharan Africa, was also set and filmed largely in France). As these and 
other films demonstrate, a film’s national identity is not reducible to its setting. 
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Films made in many of the smaller nations rely heavily on financing from 
other countries, especially Europe. In former Communist countries, privatisation and 
the demise of state-run structures of production, distribution and exhibition led to a 
crisis in the film industry. Film-makers were forced to adopt various survival 
strategies to cope with the new market pressures, including relocating to or 
collaborating with other European countries (for example, after the collapse of 
Communism at the end of the 1980s, the Polish director Krzysztof Kieslowski moved 
his production base to France and financed his films with French and Swiss money). 
Today, smaller nations often band together, either to pool funds, as in multinational 
co-productions, or to pool creative resources, as is the case with the Advance Party 
initiative between Scotland and Denmark, which is producing three films made by 
different directors set in Glasgow and based on recurring characters, of which the first 
was Red Road (Andrea Arnold, 2006).  
It is not only supra-national identities that problematise the concept of national 
cinema; these can also be complicated by sub-national affiliations. Indigenous film-
makers in postcolonial or diasporic contexts (such as aboriginal film-makers in 
Australia, Maori film-makers in New Zealand, and Native American film-makers in 
the US) sometimes prefer not to be associated with their nominal nation-states 
because they have oppositional political stances, and/or because they identify more 
strongly with their regional or tribal affiliation (or sometimes simply for the 
pragmatic reason that they have been more successful in obtaining financing from 
regional or other sub-national funding bodies).  Québequois cinema, for example, has 
achieved independent status within the larger body of Canadian cinema, largely 
because of its linguistic difference from Anglophone cinema, as well as Québec’s 
contested national status. 
 7 
Perhaps more than anything else, though, the concept of national cinema is 
driven by economic factors – domestically by state-funding criteria, and externally by 
distribution and marketing strategies. Major awards ceremonies such as the Academy 
Awards and the Cannes Film Festival still use national identity as a primary selection 
criterion, and these awards have global marketing implications. The controversy 
surrounding the national identity of the film A Very Long Engagement/Un long 
dimanche de fiançailles (Jean-Pierre Jeunet, 2004), which prevented it from 
competing in both the Academy Awards and at Cannes, hinged on the film’s 
financing from a French subsidiary of Warner Bros. Conversely, recent Iranian 
cinema, though lacking in big box-office potential, has gained a high degree of cachet 
among international critics and on the arthouse festival circuit, and in these contexts 
its national identity has served as a modestly effective promotional tool. National 
identity is also used to market films to diasporic communities around the globe. 
Unlike many African art films, which are often financed by European backers and 
circulated globally through film festivals, the indigenous Nigerian film industry (often 
referred to as Nollywood) produces some 600 films a year, mostly on video, many of 
which circulate among African communities living abroad (although widespread 
pirating prevents much of the profit from accruing to the Nigerian production 
companies). And in India, a growing number of films are aimed directly at diasporic 
communities. Economic factors nonetheless have undeniable cultural repercussions, 
and it is perhaps in the diasporic context that a national cinema retains the most 
affective resonance, contributing to the construction of what Benedict Anderson 
(1983) called ‘imagined communities’.  
Ultimately, very few film-makers set out to make a German film or a 
Taiwanese film or an American film; their films often acquire these identities 
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retrospectively, at film festivals and in books and university courses, all of which still 
rely heavily on the idea of national cinema as an organising principle. Yet this 
principle not only has an important heuristic function, it also has significant political, 
economic and affective value, which indicates that, despite the problems with 
attempts to attribute national identities to otherwise heterogeneous bodies of films, the 
concept of national cinema is not in danger of disappearing anytime soon.   
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